Aggravation of Preexisting Condition Not Separate and Compensable Element Of Damages

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, recently held that aggravation of a preexisting condition in a personal injury action is not a separate and compensable element of damages in addition to pain and suffering and loss of normal life. Luye v. Schopper, No. 1-02-0610, 2004 Ill. App. LEXIS 374, __ Ill.App.3d __, __ N.E.2d __, 2004 WL 784922 (1st Dist. Apr. 13, 2004).

In Luye, the defendants objected to the inclusion of aggravation of a preexisting condition as a separate itemized element of damage in both the jury instructions and jury verdict forms. The trial court allowed the instructions and the jury returned an itemized verdict awarding plaintiff a total of $247,580.45, with $112,000 designated for the aggravation of a preexisting condition. The defendants then filed a motion for post-trial relief based on Smith v. City of Evanston, 260 Ill. App.3d 925, 631 N.E.2d 1269, 197 Ill.Dec. 810 (1st Dist. 1994), and the post-trial motion was denied so defendants appealed.

On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in giving IPI Civil 3d No. 30.03 allowing aggravation of a preexisting condition as a separate compensable element of damages because it allowed for duplicative damages. The appellate court agreed, relying on the court's holding in the Smith case. The court held that the award for aggravation of a preexisting condition is not separate and distinct from pain and suffering and loss of normal life, and therefore IPI Civil 3d 30.03 should not have been given to the jury.